Use the certs/ fallback in every environment

TLS no longer depends on NODE_ENV: the TLS_* variables win, else certs/
is used whenever it exists (the container's /app/certs mount lands there
too), and TLS_DISABLED=1 is the only way to serve plain HTTP with a
certificate present. The plain-HTTP redirect listener now starts whenever
TLS is on, not only in development, and HTTP_REDIRECT_PORT replaces
DEV_HTTP_PORT. The installer writes TLS_DISABLED=1 for --no-https, and the
health check follows the same rule.

AGENTS.md

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ Inspect live data with `bun llm-code-assistant/query-db.ts "<sql>"` - a read-onl
 
 `install.sh` is the only supported install and update path: `curl -fsSL https://url.moduletrace.com/cobble | sudo bash`. It is idempotent, so the same script is the updater, and `--uninstall [--purge]` is the way back out. It installs Docker when missing (Linux), creates the `cobble` network, writes `$COBBLE_HOME/install.conf` and a generated `.env` (mode 600), and starts one `cobble` container. Existing secrets are never regenerated; the database is backed up to `$COBBLE_HOME/backups` before a container is replaced. The default home is `/opt/cobble`, configurable with `--home`, and everything that must survive an update lives in its `data/` directory (`db`, `media`, `computers`).
 
-HTTPS is the default. `src/scripts/generate-local-certs.ts` (run inside the app image, since a container's interfaces are not the host's; the host's IPs and name are passed with `--host`) writes a local CA and a 397-day leaf into `$COBBLE_HOME/certs`; the certificate, key and CA are mounted read only into `/app/certs` (never the CA's key) and pointed at by `TLS_CERT_FILE`, `TLS_KEY_FILE` and `TLS_CA_FILE` (process-only envs). `src/utils/resolve-tls-options.ts` turns them into `Bun.serve`'s `tls`; a half-set or unreadable pair stops the process instead of falling back to HTTP, and `isSecureRequest` then sees an `https:` URL so cookies get `Secure`. `GET /ca.crt` (`serve-local-ca.ts`) serves the local CA for devices to trust, and `GET /ca.mobileconfig` (`build-ca-profile.ts`) serves the same CA as an iOS/macOS configuration profile for one-tap install (the trust switch after it is Apple's, not ours). The CA is kept across updates; the leaf is re-issued when the `sans.txt` names change or it is within 30 days of expiring, which a rerun does. `--no-https` removes the mount and envs (for a proxy or tunnel), `--https` turns it back on, `--https-cert`/`--https-key` copy in a real certificate, `--https-host` adds names or addresses, `--https-regen` replaces the CA. A fresh install asks about HTTPS once, with the reasons, before doing any work (`ask_https`: updates keep the saved mode, `--yes` skips it, any `--https*` flag answers it; it reads `/dev/tty`, never stdin, so `curl | bash` still works, and without a terminal it prints the notice and keeps the default). The installer and the image's `HEALTHCHECK` use `curl -k` when TLS is on. `bun run gen:certs` generates the same files into `certs/` (gitignored), `bun run dev` uses them when `TLS_*` are unset (development only), and `bun run dev:phone` generates and starts in one command. A TLS port cannot answer plain HTTP, so development also starts a redirect listener one port above (`DEV_HTTP_PORT`) that 308s to the HTTPS page (`startHttpRedirect`, tested by `build-https-redirect-url`); production publishes only the HTTPS port.
+HTTPS is the default. `src/scripts/generate-local-certs.ts` (run inside the app image, since a container's interfaces are not the host's; the host's IPs and name are passed with `--host`) writes a local CA and a 397-day leaf into `$COBBLE_HOME/certs`; the certificate, key and CA are mounted read only into `/app/certs` (never the CA's key) and pointed at by `TLS_CERT_FILE`, `TLS_KEY_FILE` and `TLS_CA_FILE` (process-only envs). `src/utils/resolve-tls-options.ts` turns them into `Bun.serve`'s `tls`; a half-set or unreadable pair stops the process instead of falling back to HTTP, and `isSecureRequest` then sees an `https:` URL so cookies get `Secure`. `GET /ca.crt` (`serve-local-ca.ts`) serves the local CA for devices to trust, and `GET /ca.mobileconfig` (`build-ca-profile.ts`) serves the same CA as an iOS/macOS configuration profile for one-tap install (the trust switch after it is Apple's, not ours). The CA is kept across updates; the leaf is re-issued when the `sans.txt` names change or it is within 30 days of expiring, which a rerun does. `--no-https` removes the mount and envs (for a proxy or tunnel), `--https` turns it back on, `--https-cert`/`--https-key` copy in a real certificate, `--https-host` adds names or addresses, `--https-regen` replaces the CA. A fresh install asks about HTTPS once, with the reasons, before doing any work (`ask_https`: updates keep the saved mode, `--yes` skips it, any `--https*` flag answers it; it reads `/dev/tty`, never stdin, so `curl | bash` still works, and without a terminal it prints the notice and keeps the default). The installer and the image's `HEALTHCHECK` use `curl -k` when TLS is on. `bun run gen:certs` generates the same files into `certs/` (gitignored); the server uses them whenever `TLS_*` are unset, in every environment (there is no `NODE_ENV` gate; `pick-tls-files` decides, and `TLS_DISABLED=1` is the explicit opt-out), and `bun run dev:phone` generates and starts in one command. A TLS port cannot answer plain HTTP, so every environment starts a redirect listener one port above (`HTTP_REDIRECT_PORT`) that 308s to the HTTPS page (`startHttpRedirect`, tested by `build-https-redirect-url`); the container publishes only the HTTPS port, so that listener is reachable there only if its port is published too.
 
 The container runs with `--network cobble`, `-p BIND:PORT`, `.env` at `/app/.env` read only, the host data directory at `/data`, the docker socket at `/var/run/docker.sock`, `MAIN_SERVER=1` and `PORT`, `--init`, a `unless-stopped` restart policy and bounded json-file logs. `/data` must stay a bind mount: `resolveHostPath` turns paths under the app's own mounts into host paths for computer containers, and a named volume would break them. `DATA_DIR=/data` and `DB_DIR=/data/db` come from the Dockerfile; `entrypoint.sh` keeps bun-sqlite's schema record on the same volume.
 
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ Images are built by GitHub Actions on a published release (`.github/workflows/re
 
 Envs are set in Settings, under Environment (super admin only), not in `.env`. Table `envs` (private): `key`, encrypted `value`, `description`, `paradigm` (`EnvParadigms`: general, workspace, computer) with `workspace_id`/`computer_id`, `secret`, `expose_to_computers`. One per key and scope, enforced in `saveEnv` (`src/functions/backend/db/envs/`), since SQLite unique constraints treat NULL ids as distinct. Decrypted rows are cached per process (`grabAllEnvs`; `saveEnv`/`deleteEnv` clear it).
 
-- **App settings** (`EnvDict` in `src/dict/env-dict.ts`: `MAIN_COMPUTER_URL`, the `VAPID_*` Web Push keys and every provider preset's `key_env`) are what the app reads, through `grabEnv({ key })`: the general value, else `process.env`, so an existing `.env` still works. General only, never on computers. `ProcessOnlyEnvKeys` (`ENCRYPTION_KEY`/`SALT`, `PORT`, `DATA_DIR`, `MAIN_SERVER`, `TLS_CERT_FILE`, `TLS_KEY_FILE`, `TLS_CA_FILE`) can't be saved: they encrypt the table or are the container's own start-up settings.
+- **App settings** (`EnvDict` in `src/dict/env-dict.ts`: `MAIN_COMPUTER_URL`, the `VAPID_*` Web Push keys and every provider preset's `key_env`) are what the app reads, through `grabEnv({ key })`: the general value, else `process.env`, so an existing `.env` still works. General only, never on computers. `ProcessOnlyEnvKeys` (`ENCRYPTION_KEY`/`SALT`, `PORT`, `DATA_DIR`, `MAIN_SERVER`, `TLS_CERT_FILE`, `TLS_KEY_FILE`, `TLS_CA_FILE`, `TLS_DISABLED`, `HTTP_REDIRECT_PORT`) can't be saved: they encrypt the table or are the container's own start-up settings.
 - **Bot and computer envs** are any other key. `grabComputerEnvs` resolves one run's set (`resolveScopedEnvs`): computer beats workspace beats general; workspaces are the non-archived ones the computer shares with the run's bot, oldest winning a tie. `openComputerTools` writes them to `~/.cobble/env` and `env.json` on the computer (owner only, rewritten every run) over the sandbox's REST API (`writeComputerEnv`); the sandbox's shells read no profile, so `withComputerEnv` makes `sandbox_execute_bash` source the file and `sandbox_execute_code` (Python, JavaScript) load the JSON, invisibly to the model. Bots get keys and descriptions in the task prompt, never values, and every computer tool result is passed through `redactSecrets` (each secret value shown as `[KEY]`).
 - **API:** `api/admin/envs/` (`save-env`, `delete-env`), super admin only, logged by key, each returning `grabEnvsOverview` (secret values left out; a secret is only replaced, never read back).